On Krashen’s Input Hypothesis

Stephen Krashen’s Monitor Theory is one of the most influencial and most debated language acquisition theories. It includes five hypotheses, the most important of which is the Input Hypothesis. Krashen argues that receiving comprehensible input whose level is a bit beyond the current language competence of the learner is the only way humans acquire languages. The Input Hypothesis, as well as some pieces of evidence brought up in support of it, is too vaguely defined and thus hardly applicable in foreign language classrooms.

     VanPatten and Williams (2007) claim that the success of Monitor Theory “rests in part on its resonance with the experience of language learners and language teachers” (p. 25). It is rather difficult to imagine how a theory so abstract and so vaguely defined can resonate with real experience, though. For example, Krashen argues that ’i+1’ level input is required, ’i’ referring to the current language competence of the learner. Obviously, a level of language knowledge is not something you can easily put your hands on. What follows from this is that ’i+1’ level input cannot be defined, either.

     In fact, Krashen does not really try to define it. He argues that any input designed by and large will automatically include various levels such as ’i’, ’i+1’ or ’i-1’. However, this is not sufficient reason for failing to give a definition of a term he himself claims to be the key of language learning. If ’i+1’ is so important, a proper definition should be provided irrespective of what an average input may include.

     In his critical review of the Input Hypothesis, Gregg (1986) elaborates on this point even further. He claims that the “vagueness in the use of words like competence and rule is intolerably sloppy” (p. 119, highlighting in the original). “Competence” is not clearly defined with regard to i+1 input, and “rule” is not, either. Krashen actually confuses grammatical rules like those referring to the correct use of tenses with applied linguistics rules reflecting on, for example, second language acquisition. Gregg claims that the vagueness of Krashen’s definitions and his incorrect wording actually “reflects an ignorance of the nature and goals of linguistic theory and language acquisition theory” (p. 117).

     Krashen also claims that i+1 level input and the comprehension of meaningful messages is the only way humans acquire languages. However, it is possible to imagine situations contrary to this statement. A language is not made up of simply its words and the rules on how to combine them into meaningful units. Knowledge of stress, intonation and so on also contribute to one’s competence in a language. These aspects can be examined, understood and unconsciously memorised by a language learner even if they do not understand much of a given utterance in the foreign language to be learnt. This shows that a meaningful message formulated at a language knowledge much above the learner’s current competence can also be useful (i.e., one that is, say, i+10, whatever i means).

     Linguistic data below i can also be useful. Krashen underestimates the importance of repetition of already learnt words, structures and rules. Always learning new pieces of language knowledge simply does not work. One cannot remember everything learnt before, and especially not perfectly. It is much more difficult to learn something by memorizing it once and for all than by having a look at it several times later, too. The usefulness of the repetition of i-x level pieces (meaning language knowledge of a level below the learner’s current competence) of language knowledge cannot thus be overlooked.

     A major piece of evidence Krashen brings up to support his theory is a few pieces of research on caretaker (or caregiver) speech (CS). This refers to the simplified version of a language used when talking to a baby or a toddler that cannot understand too much of what is said to them. According to Krashen, this is the perfect example of a meaningful message at i+1 level. However, as Faltis (1984) points out, the studies Krashen refers to examine only middle-class homes in Western societies, thus their findings (which actually support the Input Hypothesis) are neither representative of all groups of a society, nor of global trends. In fact, there is a huge variation in caregiver speech around the world. For example, among Kaluli people in Papua New Guinea, it is common to speak ’for’ (in place of) very young children when they are addressed. Thus, no comprehensible message is actually directed to the language learner (Schieffelin, 1979, as summarised in Faltis, 1984). In Western Samoa, a young child is talked about, not to (Ochs, 1982, as summarised in Faltis, 1984).

     All in all, Krashen’s Input Hypothesis is very difficult to make actual use of since it is too vaguely defined. Some key terms like “competence” or concepts like “i” are not clearly defined. Krashen also confuses the two meanings of “rule”. What is more, the piece of evidence related to caregiver speech brought up in support of the theory is far from standing in all cases.

References

Faltis, C. (1984). A Commentary on Krashen’s Input Hypothesis. TESOL Quarterly,
     18(2), 352-357.

Gregg, K. R. (1986). The Input Hypothesis: Issues and Implications by Stephen D.
     Krashen. TESOL Quarterly, 20(1), 116-122.

VanPatten, B., & Williams, J. (eds., 2008). Theories in Second Language Acquisition:
     An Introduction. New York: Routledge.